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Abstract—The identification of the exact path that packets
are routed on in the network is quite a challenge. This paper
presents a novel, efficient traceback strategy named Tracemax
in context of a defense system against distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks. A single packet can be directly traced
over many more hops than the current existing techniques allow.
In combination with a defense system it differentiates between
multiple connections. It aims to letting non-malicious connections
pass while bad ones get thwarted. The novel concept allows
detailed analyses of the traffic and the transmission path through
the network. The strategy can effectively reduce the effect of
common bandwidth and resource consumption attacks, foster
early warning and prevention as well as higher the availability
of the network services for the wanted customers.
Keywords—Computer network management, IP networks, IP
packet, Traceback, Packet trace, Denial of Service
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most publicly recognized distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks took place in 2010. As protest reaction
on inhibition of WikiLeaks bank accounts, MasterCard, Visa
and PayPal as well as other large finance institutes got attacked
[9]. The coordinated action named ”Operation Payback“ has
stopped aforesaid services for several hours causing great
financial loss. In 2014, the largest detected DDoS attack had
consumed a bandwidth of over 500 Gbit/s [10]. Nowadays, no
service infrastructure can handle such large amount of data.
The power and danger of DDoS attacks is an increasingly
frequent problem in the global Internet. Attacks are not
only focused against single services but entire countries and
infrastructures. An adequate traceback and defense strategy
is needed in order to identify multiple sources and to reveal
spoofed IP addresses. It is important to get provable identi-
fication and localization of the attackers for law enforcement
and forensic analysis. Of large interest for states is especially
the source of military cyber operations or protest groups.
II. SCENARIO
The idea of an traceback strategy provided by an Internet
service provider (ISP) is illustrated by using the following real
world scenario, see Figure 1. A DDoS attack and malicious
traffic are detected at a terminal system by an intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS). The associated alarm vector triggers the
labeling service at the victims own edge router. It propagates
self-organizing this labeling task through the network. The
service is secured by cryptographic authentication. After the
configuration of the routers, all messages can be traced back.
The traffic data, path labeling data and attack meta data are
prepared and stored with time stamp to cope with the forensic
needs for trustworthy and transparent path reconstruction of
law enforcement. The service extends the data for digital
forensics in a live response scenario. In parallel, the system
starts defense actions by propagating the attack signature to
the routers. It is used for filtering, blocking or delaying of
corresponding incoming traffic and reduces the network load.
Other use cases are the verification of traffic shaping con-
figured in the network management system and identification
of hidden channels. Load balancing and zone routing can be
verified by packet tracking as well. In addition, the technique
provides an approach to detect Cormelt attacks with currently
no defense mechanisms existing. Thereby, a Botnet generate
pseudo realistic traffic between the bots at a specific network
node and overload it.
Figure 1: Traceback of sophisticated attackers.
III. REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
For our analysis, we assume that routes can dynamically
change during an attack. Furthermore, packets can get lost,
and the order of the packets within a connection can be
changed. Finally, attackers are able to generate any packet
with any faked parameters. Attackers are able to cooperate
and have knowledge of traceback strategies. According to
the scenario and the various application areas, we address
traceback strategies concerning to the following main aspects:
• Single packet traceback
• Detect and Differentiate multiple attackers
• Fast path reconstruction and preventive applicable
• Traced Hops / Locations of more than 50 hops
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A call of the website ”torproject.org” from our location is
transferred over more than 18 routers. It does not include proxy
servers or anonymizing techniques. The worst case number of
nodes traversed by a packet was about 56 hops in 2011 [3].
IV. RELATED WORK
Over the past years, many traceback and defense strategies
have been developed. The approach of Deterministic Router
Stamping (DRS) [14] is only able to trace up to 9 hops whereas
Probabilistic Router Stamping (PRS) need many packets to
reconstruct the path. Packet Marking (PM) [1] is differentiated
in Node-Sampling and Edge-Sampling. They are not efficient
with respect to the capacity. The marking information in the
payload can cause errors. Link Testing by Input Debugging
(LTID) [13] and Link Testing by Controlled Flooding (LTCF)
[2] require a continuous attack for complete attack path
identification and limit immediate live defense actions. The
approach of Logging at a router [11] creates a large amount
of data, needs a lot resources and limit live response actions.
The backward discovered path of the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) traceback approach [7] does not necessarily
match the real path of a packet, because of load balancing
and other influences. The ISP Traceback [8], [12] allows
the identification of the source ISP, but not track the direct
path. There are more algorithms and hybrid solutions to trace
packets as in [5].
All in all, the known traceback strategies do not fulfill the
identified requirements to trace the path of network packets.
V. THE NEW APPROACH: TRACEMAX
In reference to the scenario in Section II, a user sends a
specific request to his ISP to start labeling packets. This acti-
vates the novel traceback algorithm Tracemax for a predefined
number of routers. These routers have to cooperate and have
to be configured for it. Tracemax consists mainly of a marking
scheme and a reconstruction method. The routers are marking
packets on the path during the transmission. The reconstruction
method determines the path of a packet afterwards.
A. Pre-configuration and ID assignment
Before the Tracemax system is rolled out, every physical
port n of every router Ti gets his own Tracemax IDi,n. An
ID is not necessarily unique in the entire system. Still the ID
numbers have to defined in a way that the path reconstruction
is uniquely possible. In analogy of the logical port number,
an assigned Tracemax ID is oriented on it. But for every
router is not allowed to get the same incoming ID of several
connected routers. The generation of the IDs is still easy
under this condition. An automatic algorithm is described in
Listing 1. The algorithm prevents that a preselected router gets
the same ID on direct links from two neighboring routers. This
is achieved by incrementing one of the intended IDs.
Two possible valid ID assignments with minimal bit size and
with an automatic assigned version can be seen in Figure 2
and 3. An invalid example of ID assignment is shown in
Figure 4. The encircled router has twice the incoming ID
1 . S e l e c t randomly t h e f i r s t node .
2 . Ass ign e v e r y p o r t t h e ID as t h e i r p o r t number n .
3 . do {
4 . s e l e c t e d N o d e = a c o n n e c t e d node t o t h e a l r e a d y
s e l e c t e d node ( s ) , which has n o t s e l e c t e d .
5 . f o r ( a l l f r e e p o r t s o f s e l e c t e d N o d e ) {
6 . i s A s s i g n e d = f a l s e ;
7 . ID = 1 ;
8 . do {
9 . i f ( ID i s unused a t s e l e c t e d N o d e ) {
1 0 . i f ( ID != a l l incoming IDs a t t h e
c o n n e c t e d node ) {
1 1 . s e l e c t e d N o d e . p o r t I D = ID ;
1 2 . i s A s s i g n e d = t r u e ;
1 3 . }
1 4 . }
1 5 . ID ++;
1 6 . } u n t i l ( ! i s A s s i g n e d )
1 7 . }
1 8 . } u n t i l ( a l l nodes a r e s e l e c t e d )
Listing 1: Algorithm for automatic ID assignment.
number 3. Thereby the simple reconstruction function is not
able to decide between the two routers as source of a packet.
Figure 2: Valid configuration.
or
Figure 3: Valid configuration.
A strong reconstruction algorithm, which gives attention on
the transfer direction of a packet, is possible to resolve even
some conflicted IDs. Nevertheless, every router in the network
should mark packets. This avoids unclear or incomplete ID
sequences, which can not be reconstructed to a transmission
path. But it is not mandatory for a clear path reconstruction
that the entire network is completely configured to mark
packets. With genial predefined and assigned IDs single rou-
ters can be bridged, see Figure 5. This ID assignment allows
a unique path reconstruction even the network device in the
middle do not marking transfered packets.
Figure 4: Invalid ID assignment. Figure 5: A bridged router.
B. Marking scheme
Every router Ti on the path writes the predefined IDi,n in the
Option Field of the IP packet. Even if the size is very limited
(40 bytes), the Option Field in our case is best choice and the
size is sufficient. This increases the network load only slightly
and has no side effects. Our defined unique IDi,n number with
less than 6 bits for labeling every port n of an active network
device i is much smaller than 32 bits of an IPv4 address.
In this way we can store many more hops in form of IDs
into the Option Field. The precise necessary bit size of the ID
number (n= 1..k) depends on the situation. The bit size hangs
indirectly on the router Ti with most physical connections k,
which is in the predefined area of Tracemax. For performance
improvement, single network devices with many ports can
be virtually split in multiple devices to lower the maximum
necessary bit size for an ID number. The IDi,n can be seen
as a lower ISO/OSI layer information, for example the port
number of a physical connection on a router. In the process
of development, the Tracemax ID is declared as an abstract
number, which is independent from the port number. This
allows improvements during the ID assignment and leads to a
reduced bit size for the IDs. Every router Ti writes the assigned
and predefined ID of the physical port into the packets Option
Field at the outgoing interface. The next router can prove the
value.
C. Reconstruction scheme
The reconstruction function extracts the IDs out of the IP
header. The sequence of IDs defines the used connections
between the routers and thereby the path of the packet.
The function needs information about the endpoint where
the packet is captured. This information can be stored with
the packets or the user already knows it. In most cases the
reconstruction is running at the same system as the endpoint.
Otherwise, the last and closest IP address to the destination
could be stored completely into the Option Field as well. The
function correlates the sequence of the IDs with the knowledge
of the network infrastructure and the predefined IDs. This is
done step-by-step backwards, starting from the receiver node
until the last marked node is found. Due to the precise ID
assignment only one possible connection is valid in every
step of the backward path reconstruction. The administrator of
Tracemax has all necessary information allowing the complete
reconstruction of the path. The function can also map these
routers to their IP addresses. In the end, the order of the routers
and the IP addresses of the path are known.
D. Additional extensions
If an incoming packet is entered into the managed Tracemax
system, the information in the Option Field has to be deleted.
This prevents injecting of false information and generates
space for the own traceback information. This is the case at the
borders of different Tracemax systems or ISPs. An incoming
packet at a Tracemax system edge router should be labeled
with the sending router IP address from the routing table or
with an additional ID. Thus the path reconstruction is extended
with reference to the first external routing device. Also if
a packet leaves the managed Tracemax components the last
marking edge router can store an information about the next
network device without marking functionality into the Option
Field. This also supports to bridge network devices.
In summary, the Option Field includes in the complete
version the following information: [Preamble : IP-Sender : 1st
ID : 2nd ID : 3rd ID : ..... : n-1. ID : n. ID : IP-Receiver].
A stepwise roll out or limited deployment of the Tracemax
System is possible. Thus it allows to trace the path of a
transfered packet only partly.
A large advantage of Tracemax is that it does not provide
any information about the private topology information of an
ISP even if someone gets access to the IDs in the Option
Field. The IDs could also be changed in a short interval to
avoid reverse engineering. In the scenario of DDoS we have
to assume that IP spoofing is used by the attacker. This aspect
does not influence our Tracemax strategy because it is not
based on IP source addresses.
E. Storing the information in the IP header
In the following, the Preamble and the entire Option Field
is explained in more detail, because not all of the available
bytes are free and flexible usable. The IP header in version 4
is 20 bytes large and offers an additional Option Field with
the variable length of up to 40 bytes, dependent on Padding.
There are two different formatting styles to add information
in the Option Field. The traceback information can either be
added as single octet. Tracemax on the other hand uses the
defined option-length to be able to predefine the necessary
space. The Preamble of all option-type parts is: 1 bit Copied
Flag, 2 bits Option Class, and 5 bits Option Number.
The 1 bit Copied Flag defines that this option part is copied
into all fragments. Thus every single packet is traced so it
will be set to 02. For the 2 bit Class Field exists different
valid possibilities. The measurement parameter with 102 is
most fitting for our case. A list of all different specified 5 bits
Option Number parameters can be found at [6]. We have to
find a value, which do not create conflicts. Tracemax uses the
unassigned option number 101102 (2210). In combination, the
1st octet is: 8610 = 0x56 = 010101102
The Option Number parameters has a traceroute option, but
it offers only the possibility to count the hops and do not allow
to traceback a packet. It is very important to give attention on
this formatting, because of possible malformed packets or the
unintentionally mapping with some other option values. For
example, the two option values Loose Source Route and Strict
Source Route are discouraged because of security concerns [4]
and will be dropped.
Furthermore, this octet is followed by the option-length
octet, which specifies the length of the current option part
including the option part header. The size can be between 0
and 40 byte. It is possible to extend the header according to
the demand. The 2nd octet is: 4010 = 0x28 = 001010002
This concept can be easily adapted to IP version 6. For
this, it is necessary to define a new Next Header to store the
traceback information.
VI. PROOF OF CONCEPT AND EVALUATION
The evaluation of the Tracemax is based on experiments
using a prototypic implementation. Our approach is
implemented with the interactive packet manipulation
and generation tool Scapy, which is written in Python.
We have set up trial installations with multiple network
components and several computer. The network components
for packet marking are realized by computer with appropriate
router configuration. Thus, the tests are very realistic. The
Python Script, Listing 2, describes the marking algorithm
of Tracemax, which is used at every router. First, the script
detects whether the incoming packet has an Option Field or
not. Accordingly, the Option Field is copied or added with
the Preamble ’\x56\x28’. It extends the Option Field with its
specific ID defined in the variable ’myindex’, here the value
’\x12’. For simplification, every router has only one ID to
mark the packets with. We also avoid a dynamic extension
of the Option Field for the tests. After a new packet is
generated, it will be send to the next network hop. For the
experiments, the Script filters on ICMP packets.
from scapy . a l l i m p o r t ∗
d e f chgSend ( x ) :
myindex = ’\x12 ’ # A s s i g n e d Por t I d e n t i f i e r
o p t i o n s a r r a y = x [ IP ] . o p t i o n s # Opt ion F i e l d
i f o p t i o n s a r r a y . c o u n t ( 1 ) == 0 and
s t r ( o p t i o n s a r r a y ) != ’ [ ] ’ :
o p t i o n s s t r i n g = s t r ( o p t i o n s a r r a y [ 0 ] )
e l s e : o p t i o n s s t r i n g = ’\x56\x28 ’
# Genera te p a c k e t
y=IP ( s r c =x [ IP ] . s r c , d s t =x [ IP ] . d s t , l e n =60 , o p t i o n s =
I P O p t io n ( o p t i o n s s t r i n g +myindex ) ) / x [ IP ] . p a y l o a d
send ( y )
w h i l e 1 : # L i s t e n t o t h e ne twork i n t e r f a c e
s n i f f ( p rn =chgSend , l f i l t e r = lambda x :
x . h a s l a y e r ( ICMP) , c o u n t =1)
Listing 2: Python script for Tracemax.
During the evaluation, every machine runs Wireshark for
packet capturing. The reconstruction of the path is done
manually to examine and resolve possible problems. The
Wireshark traces show the packet marking in the Option Field
after each hop. The transmission path can be reconstructed
in combination with the known information about the ID
assignment. The experiments validate our concept and show
the easy implementation as well as the practicability. To extend
the IP-Header with the entire 40 bytes, it creates a small
additional network load of 2.6 % for a 1500 bytes packet.
To summarize the results, Table I compares our Tracemax
system with the existing strategies. The symbols have the follo-
wing meaning in comparison to the other traceback techniques:
+ advantage; - disadvantage; o neutral.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented the concept of a strong traceback strategy
Tracemax and an idea to defense against DDoS attacks. It
can track the path of just a single packet through the network
and address forensic intentions. Tracemax can trace significant
longer paths than existing methods, detect variable routes
during a communication, and distinguish multiple attackers.
The technique does not affect the payload data of the packet.
Therefore, the labeling information does not need to be cleared
before delivery. The novel strategy reduces the impact of an
attack on the victim and the entire network. The presented
Table I: Comparison of different traceback strategies
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Ingress Filtering 0 - + + + + - + + + + +
RS-DRS 9 + o o o + + o + + + +
RS-PRS ∞ + o o o + + o - + - -
PM-Node-Samp. ∞ + + o + o + o o + + +
PM-Edge-Samp. 1 edge o - o + o + o - + - -
LT-Input Debug. ∞ o - + o o o - - - - -
LT-Cont. Flood. ∞ - - o - + o + - - - -
Logging ∞ + + + + - - + - + + +
ICMP <256 o o - + + + + + - + +
ISP Traceback ISP - o - + + + + + + + o
Tracemax >50 + + + + + + o + + + +
solution focus directly on the unwanted traffic with negligi-
ble influence on good users. Due to its minimal additional
overhead and simple requirements the system results in good
scalability and allow a preventive usage.
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